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Tientsin and Peking the outrages of Hankow, Shanghai (outside the Settlements) and Nanking. Their diplomacy in any negotiations they may think fit to undertake in regard to such matters as reparation for the outrages at Nanking; a reasonable agreement in regard to Shanghai; the cessation of anti-foreign demonstrations in the areas controlled by the Cantonese, now has behind it the possibility of a sanction which, though reasonably effective, involves the minimum prospects of active hostilities or bloodshed.
6. We had reached this point in our deliberations when we received from the Foreign Office, for our urgent consideration, copies of telegrams Nos. 540 of the 28th March and 547 of the 20th March, from Sir Miles Lampson, in the latter of which it was stated that the British, Japanese and American Ministers had met and decided to recommend that formidable demands for punishment, apology and repara- tion be made by the Consuls-General at Shanghai to the General Officer commanding the Cantonese Army. That telegram also indicated the view of the said Ministers that the best sanction would be a blockade of the Yangtse and Canton. suggestion it will be noticed exactly fits in with our views expressed above, though the importance of our ability to deny the crossing of the Yangtse appears to have been overlooked by the Ministers at Peking.
This
7. Before any action is taken to give effect to our proposals, it will be necessary to extricate all British nationals on the Middle and Upper Yangtse. In a previous report we have pointed out that the protection of the smaller Concessions-and this applies equally to British interests at ports where there are no Concessions-must devolve upon the Naval forces, but that the Navy can only afford protection against mob violence. If it is a question of dealing with military forces, evacuation will usually be the only course (C.I.D. Paper No. 756-B).
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8. We learn that Sir Miles Lampson has given definite orders to the Consular officers at Chungking, Shangsha and Ichang to evacuate their ports, themselves included (Sir M. Lampson, Peking, telegram No. 541, dated the 28th March, 1927).
0. We recommend that, before any action is taken to put pressure on the Cantonese Government of the nature indicated above, definite orders should be given for the evacuation of all ports above Hankow.
10. If this recommendation is carried out, and British nationals are withdrawn from above Hankow, we see no object in the retention of the British gunboats on the Middle Yangtse (Appendix (A)). The Admiralty have telegraphed to the Naval Commander-in-Chief to invite his views on the question, and, subject to his reply, we recommend that the withdrawal of the British nationals should be accompanied by the retirement of the British gunboats. We understand that the withdrawal of H.M.S." Mantis," which draws too much water to pass down the gorges, may prove a difficulty. We hope, however, that it may be found possible to overcome this by lightening the ship, possibly even at the cost of jettisoning one or both of the 6-inch guns. This is a matter on which the Naval Commander-in-Chief will advise. In the last resort it might even be necessary to sacrifice the "Mantis," after the withdrawal of the crew by H.M.S. "Teal."
11. The withdrawal from the Upper Yangtse should be systematically organised, proceeding from the highest point on the river downwards. We believe that it can be accomplished in a few days, at the outside within a week of the order being given. We suggest that the order of withdrawal should be given irrespective of what other nations decide to do, but, as a matter of international courtesy and loyalty, we assume that a warning of our intention, coupled possibly with advice to take a similar course, would be issued to the French, American and Japanese Governments, all of which have gun-boats on the River Yangtse.
12. Assuming that British nationals have been withdrawn in safety to Hankow and that an ultimatum has been issued, preferably by several Powers jointly but possibly by the British Government alone, to the Cantonese Government, accompanied by a time limit, we contemplate that there should be a considerable concentration of warships at Hankow (where the whole of the gunboats from the upper river will be assembled and whither cruisers of the "C" Class can already
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proceed*), as well as at Nanking and at such other points as the Naval Commander- in-Chief may decide. At Hankow and Nanking, we should be in a position to interrupt cross-river traffic on the principal lines of railway from South to North China. The interception of troop movements could be accomplished irrespective of other Powers.
13. Provided that we have the support of sufficient foreign Powers, we could, in addition, proclaim a blockade of the Yangtse and stop all traffic on the river from Shanghai to Hankow. All floating craft of every kind should be brought within our jurisdiction, so that no movement of any sort could take place on the river without our permission. In this way our measures would remain effective even next winter in the period of low water.
14. At first sight there is one difficulty in carrying out the above programme. namely, the existence at Kiang yin, on the Yangtse, of fixed defences. On paper these defences are very powerful, and include a 12-inch B.L. gun. Such informa- tion as the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty War Staff possesses is to the effect that the guns have not been fired for years. In any event we think that the guns could be dealt with by means of aerial attack and bombardment by ships. The Admiralty are in communication with the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the subject and unless he reports to the contrary they need not be regarded as a serious factor in the situation.
15. Simultaneously with a blockade of the Yangtse we recommend a blockade of the approaches to Canton.
16. We do not at present recommend that authority should be given for the Occupation of the Bogue Forts, recommended by the Governor of Hong Kong in his telegram of the 26th March. This operation would involve the use of military forces and the occupation of Chinese territory. Insufficient troops for the purpose are available at Hong-Kong, and those surplus to the garrison of that fortress form part of the Shanghai Defence Force and ought not to be committed to any other opera- tion. In fact, generally we are opposed at this juncture to any action which would involve an additional commitment of unknown scope in China involving the land forces.
17. In the event of a blockade at Canton, we recommend that the Shameen should continue to be held in accordance with the recommendations of our Report of the 18th January, 1927 (C.I.D. Paper No. 762-B), the Conclusions of which were summarised in paragraph 15 as follows:-
(1.) That the British Consul-General at Canton, the Governor and the naval and military authorities at Hong-Kong should receive instructions to the following effect :-
(a.) That the men on the spot should have full discretion to hold the Shameen as long as they consider possible, whether against mob violence or against Cantonese troops, with such forces as can be placed at their disposal from Hong-Kong, having regard to conclusion (c) below.
(b.) That arrangements should be made for the evacuation from Shameen of all non-combatants before serious trouble eventuates, the exact time for such evacuation being left to the man on the spot.
(c.) That no further reinforcements can be despatched to Hong-Kong for
the defence of Shameen.
(d.) That the use of aircraft, in connection with the defence of Shameen, is permitted, and that, should the situation necessitate it, the shelling of vital points in Canton or of the river defences is permitted.
(2.) That, if considerations other than military allow, the Acting Consul- General, Canton, should be authorised, as proposed in his telegram No. 5 of the 13th January, to inform the General in Command of the Chinese Forces,
* We are informed that, though the depth of water at present permits of this, such a condition does not usually exist before the 15th April. The possibility of a temporary fall in the water during the next two weeks cannot be excluded.
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